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Abstract: Changes in understanding and interpretation of decision-making processes have shed more 
light on complex interplay given the different settings, and different actors. The limitations 
in human decision-making and their significance and long-term implications on organi-
zational management or policy making inspired a large body of evidence and research. 
Exploration of decision-making processes spans over decades, and is closely connected to 
the role of power; the amount of power in organizations is usually joined by the knowledge 
and prior experience, which together play a significant role in decision-making process, 
as well in selection of candidates for the job. However, there is an evident void concern-
ing publications on decision-making processes in academic institutions, and it rapidly be-
comes the focus of interest due to a specific opposition contained in its core; positions of 
high level administrators are held by the university professors with no mandatory previous 
experience and/or knowledge in organisational management. 
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Introduction
People face a huge variety of decisions every day; from which shoes to wear, to 
whom to marry, or what university to be enrolled in. In the past, the history of re-
search of everyday judgements was greatly influenced by the classical model of ratio-
nal choice. This model has been applied mostly in economics, but its influence was 
widely spread and still exists in most behavioural and social sciences, as well as in 
the fields of law or medicine. According to this model, people are the ‘rational ac-
tors’ who make decisions by assessing the probability of each given option’s possible 
outcome, along with the utility that is to be derived from each. The winning option is 
the one with the optimal combination of probability and utility (Gilovich and Griffin, 
2002). Theory of rational choice assumes that people do rather well in the process. 
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However, decision-making research from the mid 20th century onwards suggest-
ed that people’s assessments of likelihood and risk do not conform to the laws of 
probability. Furthermore, significance of empirical evidence was demonstrated in 
the past by the surveys that showed the discrepancy between the assessments and the 
actual performance (Meehl, 1954, and Gilovich and Griffin, 2002), and the fact that 
intuitive judgements do not exactly correspond to the ‘ideal’ normative standards 
(Edwards, 1968 in Gilovich and Griffin, 2002). Simon (1957) offered the most signif-
icant theoretical development with the notion that ‘full rationality’, implied by the ra-
tional choice model, was the unrealistic standard for human judgement; he proposed 
more limited criteria for actual performance (the bounded rationality) that acknowl-
edged the limitations of the human mind. According to his model, people reason and 
choose rationally, but only within the constraints imposed by their limited search and 
computational capacities (Gilovich and Griffin, 2002). Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky further developed and demonstrated the idea of bounded rationality based on 
heuristics and biases in their Prospect theory (1979). 
The limitations in human decision-making and their significance and long-term 
implications in organizational and governmental institutions’ management or policy 
making, inspired a large body of evidence and research in certain areas; the research 
of decision-making processes in organizations has quite a history, and is closely con-
nected to the role of power in organizational decision-making. The amount of power 
in private sector organizations is usually joined by the knowledge of management 
and prior experience, which together play a significant role in decision-making pro-
cess, as well in selection of candidates for the job.
Nevertheless, when it comes to the universities/faculties, there is a huge void con-
cerning publications on decision-making processes. The particularity of the manage-
ment of the academic institutions in its core contains the opposition; positions of high 
level administrators are held by the university professors with no mandatory previous 
experience in managing large organisations. 
Decision-Making Theories
One of the longest lasting is the economic theory of expected utility that was first 
proposed by Daniel Bernoulli (1738). Bernoulli was intrigued by how much a rational 
individual is prepared to pay in order to enter a gamble. It was perceived that gam-
blers would pay expected value of the gamble, but nothing more. However, based on 
an example of throwing coins1, Bernoulli concluded that individuals are prepared to 
pay a small amount of money for this type of gambles, indicating that individuals 
exchange monetary value bets for some kinds of ‘utilities’ (Suhonen, 2007). 
One of the key features of the decision-making field is its multidisciplinarity, 
since several basic and different ideas inspired most prominent research. Stemming 
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from economic sciences, but also mathematics and physics, early theories assumed 
humans as fully rational actors aiming at maximising their utilities. However, in the 
preface of the first edition of his ‘Principles of Economics’ written in September 
1890, Alfred Marshall explained that ‘Economic laws and reasonings in fact are 
merely a part of the material which Conscience and Common-sense have to turn 
to account in solving practical problems, and in laying down rules which may be a 
guide in life’ (Marshall, 1920), opening door for other disciplines to offer solutions 
and answers to some of basic inquires of the process. Decision-making theories made 
their way from involving other disciplines than economics into the decision-making 
process, to rather complex variations taking into account uncertain conditions, bias-
es, and risk perceptions as major determinants.
Homo Economicus and Introduction of Bounded Rationality
Decision-making has puzzled scientists from different fields for centuries. Stemming 
from economic sciences, early theories assumed humans as fully rational actors 
aiming at maximising their utilities. At the turn of the 20th century, political econo-
my dealt with ‘homo economicus’ who was under no influence of ethical concerns, 
completely rational, acting mechanically and driven purely selfishly. Classical or Ex-
pected Utility Theory (EUT) could have handled a wide range of situations where 
uncertainty and guessing did not play an important role. However, when situations 
involving decision-making under uncertainty and imperfect competition were ex-
amined, an idea for replacing the classical theory by a model of bounded rational-
ity began to emerge (Simon, 1978). The complexity and instability of environment 
became a central feature of choices that economic man faced. In order to explain 
human behaviour within a complex and changing environment, the theory must have 
described a person as more than an adaptive mechanism. While EUT was a rather 
simple in explanation of human behaviour, behavioural theory of bounded rationality 
(irrationality) proposed by Simon, argued that the amount of information surround-
ing people is so vast and complex that people are challenged to organise it, formulate 
problems, and choose appropriate solutions. Complexity of environment and limited 
human computational capacities fit the general term of ‘bounded rationality’. 
Empirical Studies
Empirical studies offered more evidence of violation of perfect rationality and utility 
maximisation. Organizational decision-making was the first one observed, and those 
early studies were mostly conducted by anthropologists who focused on describing 
decision-making procedures and processes. Economic surveys also started in the 
1950s i.e. about the use of accounting data in decision-making in large corporations, 
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followed by a series of studies on policy decisions in a number of companies by 
Cyert, Simon and Trow (1956).  With a huge number of research done by economists 
in the domain in Europe and the US, for a long time it remained vastly unexplored, 
mostly due to costs, time constraints, lack of proper methodology in order to access 
the decision-making behaviour, etc. 
Additionally, a lot of criticism for classical theory has been sparked by exper-
iments, since it has been noticed that decision-makers systematically violate the 
rationality axioms (Suhonen, 2007). There are several famous paradoxes showing 
violation of rationality and utility such as Allais paradox2, or Common ratio effect, 
and other paradoxes found in the course of the following decades. One of them is 
‘preference reversal’ reported by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). They showed that 
decision-maker’s behaviour was not consistent when monetary values were added to 
choices; the order of choices and monetary values of the choices were inconsistent 
with each other. Another paradox is ‘the Ellsberg paradox’ (1961) showing that that 
decision-makers could be influenced by additional information in a way that changes 
their preferences from the certain to the uncertain case, without change in probabil-
ities or in winning prizes. 
Such inconsistencies enabled a number of alternatives for decision-making pro-
cess, and one of the most prominent was ‘the Prospect theory’.
The Prospect Theory
In the following years and decades other social sciences contributed to reveal the 
influence of complexity and change of environment combined with deeper insight 
into the mechanisms of decision-making. Probably best-known theory in the recent 
decades is the Prospect Theory. In 1979, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky proposed a theory of individual decision making under risk based on exper-
imental findings suggesting that people do not make decisions in a way the Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) predicts. They have formulated the Prospect Theory based 
on human reactions to monetary outcomes and linked probabilities, at the same 
time stressing how risk representation through simple monetary games also serves 
as identification of fundamental attitudes towards risk and value. Ultimately, their 
ground-breaking work was awarded with the Nobel prize in Economics in 2002. The 
study of human decision-making was irrevocably changed with the introduction of 
the Prospect Theory, and challenged the dominance of rational models. Furthermore, 
introduction of heuristics and biases, as reflexive tools helping to make the complex 
mental problems more manageable, but possibly leading to errors in judgements, 
sparked an enormous body of research in psychology and influenced other fields like 
economics, law, political science and management.
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Naturalistic Decision-Making Theories
The most recent direction in the vast field of decision-making research body belongs 
to the Naturalistic theories of decision-making (NDM). The most prominent author 
who marked the beginnings of NDM in early 1990s is Gary Klein (2002). Models 
and theories within NDM have emerged from rejection of both classical decision 
theory, as well as decision research based mostly in laboratories; it suggests that both 
approaches haven’t succeeded in explaining the decision-making processes in a re-
al-world context. But these group of theories are also quite distinct from the direction 
taken by Kahneman and Tversky, and their ground-breaking work with the Prospect 
Theory. If that direction has focused on what people do wrong, then the second di-
rection or path is focusing on what people do right. 
NDM is focusing on what people do right by close examination of the heuristics 
and the study of expertise, in order to learn more powerful heuristics. According to 
Lipshitz et al. (2001), NDM is an attempt to understand how people make decisions in 
real-world contexts that are meaningful and familiar to them. Real-world contexts re-
fer to situations that include dynamic and continually changing conditions, real-time 
reactions to these changes, ill-defined goals and tasks, time pressure, uncertainty, 
missing data, significant personal consequences, and experienced decision-makers. 
Proficient decision-makers in NDM are defined as people with relevant experience 
or knowledge in the decision-making domain who directly rely on their experience.  
Organisational and Academic Decision-Making
Decision-making has traditionally been viewed as a complex interplay of high-level 
processes, involving option generation, evaluation of risks and consequences, and 
choice of a course of action in line with personal preferences (Baron, 2008; Hastie 
& Dawes, 2001). Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2002) created a model which assumed 
that the behaviour-oriented decision-making process was affected by four broad cat-
egories: problem characteristics; decision characteristics; personal disposition; and 
decision-making context. 
Managers as Decision-Makers
Managers see themselves as decision-makers (Laroche, 1995). Many activities in 
organizations are designed, operated and perceived as decision-making activities, 
and organization members frequently refer to decisions as realities of their organiza-
tional life. Decisions exist in the eyes of managers. Decisions are a significant part of 
organization processes. Decision-making theories rarely questioned the status of the 
manager as a decision-maker. The rational model of decision-making (Allison, 1971) 
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placed an isolated decision-maker at the heart of the process, up to extent that Nioche 
(1985) speaks about ‘the model of the lone actor’. 
In the alternative, realistic view of decision-making, the decision-maker is cer-
tainly not always a central character. The political school redefines the decision-mak-
ing as an actor among other actors (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). The idea of actors 
introduces a distance between the decision and the individuals involved: distance in 
strategic terms, in the way that actors approach the decisions in relation to their in-
terests and positions in the system; distance in terms of power and control, since the 
actor is only one of the forces that influence the process. Bureaucratic, organizational 
or behavioural theories of decision-making (Cyert and March 1963; Carter 1971) 
demonstrate that many decisions are produced without significant and deliberate in-
tervention of human actors. Decision-makers frequently disappear behind routines 
and automatic processes.
Several theoretical approaches addressed the environment conditions as the key 
determinant in decision-making in organisations. In a dynamic or uncertain environ-
ment, comprehensiveness is doomed to failure since the data are not available, rela-
tionships are not obvious, and the future is unpredictable (Goll and Rasheed, 1997). 
Comprehensive processes are time-consuming, and in a fast-changing environment 
a slow decision-making process would be clearly inappropriate. Fredrickson (1984) 
and Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) empirically demonstrated that rationality, rep-
resented by the comprehensiveness of the planning process, is positively related to 
performance in an industry with a stable environment and negatively related to per-
formance in a dynamic environment. In a subsequent study of the same firms in the 
same two industries, Fredrickson and Iaquinto (1989) found that these relationships 
are stable over time and that comprehensiveness exhibits considerable inertia. Within 
the Naturalistic Decision-Making theories, one of the first references to organiza-
tions can be traced back to the work of Beach who provided an image theory of 
individual decision-making for personal and organizational decisions. The theory 
states that decision-makers have three images which guide or limit the decisions they 
make (Beach, 2016): (1) a set of values and beliefs; (2) specific goals to which the de-
cision maker or organization is striving; (3) defined operational plans for reaching the 
goals. Similar to the NDM framework, Beach stresses goal-oriented behaviour, but 
also recognizes the importance of merging individual decision-making with other 
organizational stakeholders. Following up on Beach, Schmitt (2013) reported about 
the peculiarities of decision-making in the context of business and industrial orga-
nizations. Managerial decisions as part of the process in which many other elements 
of a ‘people’ nature are equally important, was highlighted as being a key within 
large organizations. New research directions include the importance of the group and 
climate of organizations. Need to evaluate decisions in terms of outcomes was also 
noted, but that the measurement of significant criteria would remain problematic. 
Also, the exploration of heuristics (Selart et al. 2000) within organizations which 
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relate to cognitive rules of thumb in decision-making processes has been examined. 
Other organizational decision research which has been discussed within the NDM 
community has included a focus upon management decision-making. Managers are 
often challenged by factors identified by the NDM framework including: ill-structured 
problems; uncertain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-defined or competing goals; 
action/feedback loops; time stress and high stakes; organizational goals and norms. 
However, researchers who have explored managers within organizations at the level 
of individual, group and organization all commonly appear to recognize that different 
strategies of decision-making are required for organisational effectiveness. It appears 
that within the context of the organization, and the business world, decision-making 
research requires a broad approach in order to fully understand the process. Recent 
evidence of this broadening is evident in research conducted by Klein (2004, 2005), 
beginning to explore the complexities of cultural differences and cognition. 
Academics as Decision-Makers
Higher education area has become an increasingly complex environment, request-
ing a great extent of devotion and skill from the academic leaders. Unpredictable 
and changing funding conditions across Europe, and beyond, constant demand for 
results, more external projects, increased scientific production, exceptional metrics, 
etc. create an extremely complex environment putting a huge pressure on leaders and 
forcing them to think in complex ways and to perceive organisational events from 
a number of different perspectives. Weick’s multi-perspective thinking (1979) has 
introduced the notion that human behaviour is complex enough to generate many dif-
ferent and sometimes conflicting interpretations. With increased information gener-
ated by these different perspectives, leaders have a broader view of the organisation, 
and an increased number of decision-making options. Building on that notion, Del 
Favero (2006) found that, under some conditions, academic discipline is supported 
as a factor enabling multi-framing behaviour of deans. However, that cannot be gen-
eralized; for a dean who thinks complexly, but is less swift in differentiating between 
the circumstances where engagement of perspectives is important versus those where 
perspective taking may be constrained by time-sensitive decisions, can be at a serious 
disadvantage. It can result in a less effective behaviour despite the ability to think 
complexly. However, the research on the ability to view complex situations from a 
variety of perspectives has been seldom.
Wolverton and al. (1999a) reported that work of academic decision makers has 
long-term effects and consequences, suggesting important implications of this par-
ticular role for successful management of academic institutions and facing increasing 
demands in higher education area. According to them, academic decision makers 
should be more carefully examined since they occupy the highest position in aca-
demic institutions and serve as CEOs of academic administrative operations. The 
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positions in academic institutions’ managements require daily coping and navigation 
between academic and managerial activities taking into account the complexity as-
sumed by both roles. 
Conclusion
There is a substantial evidence suggesting corporate managers use both the intuitive 
and analytical approaches in the decision-making, and that personality plays a part 
in their decision-making behaviour. Some studies show specific associations between 
executive functions and cognitively demanding decision-making tasks, as valid in-
dicators of analytic decision-making. However, there is an obvious lack of evidence 
regarding academic decision-makers. Del Favero (2006) suggest more complex influ-
ence of academic discipline on administrative behaviour than expected or perceived 
before. Faculties and universities are getting increasingly complex as organisations, 
with effective decision-making processes less clear and predictable. In such circum-
stances, organisational decision-making could be affected both in process and in 
content. Academic administrative managers have to adapt in order to streamline the 
implications for institutional governance and the quality of administrative decisions. 
Del Favero findings suggest that academic discipline should also be taken into ac-
count as a possible factor in predicting the extent of cognitive complexity associated 
with the administrative behaviour of academic decision-makers.
NOTES
1 Bernoulli proved so-called St. Petersburg gamble or paradox - coin is repeatedly thrown until we get 
heads. Our winning sum is 2n, where n is a number of throws until we get the first heads. As there is 
always a non-zero probability that n can be very large, the winning sum can increase infinitely. 
2 Allais paradox - comparing participants’ choices in two different experiments, each of which consists 
of a choice between two gambles, A and B. The inconsistency stems from the fact that in expected 
utility theory, equal outcomes (e.g. $1 million for all gambles) added to each of the two choices should 
have no effect on the relative desirability of one gamble over the other; they should ‘cancel out’.
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